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Case No. 20080921-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Harry Miller,  
Petitioner/Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
State of Utah, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Brief of Appellee 
 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 This is an appeal from an order granting the State’s motion to dismiss a post-
conviction petition for determination of factual innocence (addendum A). 
 This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(f) West 
2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
 1.  Did the court err by granting the state’s motion to dismiss the 
postconviction petition for determination of factual innocence without holding an 
evidentiary hearing that would have duplicated a prior 23B factual hearing?  
 Standard of Review.  “We review an appeal from an order dismissing or 
denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the 
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lower court’s conclusions of law.”  Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 913 
(citations omitted).   
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relate to this appeal:   
• Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence - Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-9-401 through § 78B-9-405 (West 2008).  The text is contained in 
Addendum B. 
  
• Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C - the text is contained in Addendum C. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 On February 18, 2003, the State charged petitioner Miller with one count of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1999)§ (R2. 3).1  A jury convicted Miller as charged, and the trial court sentenced 
him to a prison term of five years to life (R2. 83, 136).  Miller filed a timely appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court (R2. 139).  That court transferred the case to the Utah Court 
of Appeals (R2. 154). 
 While his appeal was pending, Miller filed a motion under rule 23B, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, to remand his case to supplement the record with 
evidence to support his appellate claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (R2. 
160–212).  Specifically, Miller asserted that his counsel failed to conduct a reasonable 
                                              
1 This brief refers to the record in this civil case, no. 080907781, as “R,” and to 
the record in the criminal case, no. 031901163FS, as “R2.”  
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investigation of his alibi and that, but for his counsel’s alleged failure, the jury 
would have acquitted him (R2. 164–67).  
 On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which Miller, 
Miller’s trial counsel, Miller’s former appellate counsel, and Miller’s niece, Berthella, 
testified (R2. 610 & 611).  The trial court made findings of fact and concluded that 
Miller’s trial counsel was not ineffective (addendum D, R13-26).  
 Nevertheless, on appeal, the parties agreed that there was an error in the trial 
proceedings and that the interests of justice dictated that Miller receive a new trial 
(addendum E, R27-29).  They therefore filed a stipulated motion for summary 
reversal.  Id.  The Utah Court of Appeals granted the motion and remanded the case 
to the Third District Court for a new trial (R30).   
 In the district court, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the case and the 
trial court dismissed all charges “in the interest of justice.”  (addendum F).  Miller 
was released from custody the same day (R137). 
 The following year, Miller filed his petition for determination of factual 
innocence (R1-54).  The State filed its answer to the petition (R61-63) and a motion to 
dismiss (R64-134).  Miller filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to 
dismiss (R135-158).  The State filed a reply (R161-166).  On September 30, 2008, the 
court entered an order granting the State’s motion to dismiss (R171-173).  Miller 
timely appealed (R180).   
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Robbery 
 On the morning of December 8, 2000, Julia Smart was robbed at knifepoint 
outside a Stop ‘n Go on 610 North 400 West in Salt Lake City (R2. 158:49, 52–54).  
The assailant took her purse and attempted to take her car (R2. 158:54–56).  When he 
was unable to shift the car from park into reverse, he left the car and fled on foot 
(R2. 158:61). 
 Julia described her assailant as a black man, approximately five feet eight 
inches tall, with a medium build (R2. 158:62).  He had a goatee with graying 
towards the bottom, high cheekbones, and “very distinctive” eyes (R2. 158:62).  She 
described his skin color as not dark black, “but an average black man” (R2. 158:62).2 
 When the assailant first accosted Julia, he grabbed her and mumbled 
something she could not understand (R2. 158:52–53).  He mumbled a couple of more 
times before Julia understood that he was saying, “I’ll cut you” (R2. 158:53).  Julia 
looked down and saw that he had a knife pointed at her throat (R2. 158:54).  Julia 
released her grip on her purse and the assailant took it (R2. 158:54).  He then turned 
and jumped into the driver’s seat of Julia’s car, which she had left running (R2. 
158:54–55). 
                                              
2 A police report filed after the incident stated that Julia had described her 
assailant as eighteen to twenty-one years old (R2. 158:63).  At trial, Julia did not 
remember telling the police this and believed it was a mistake (R2. 158:53).   
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 Julia ran into the Stop ‘n Go and reported the robbery to the store clerk (R2. 
158:55).  The clerk immediately called the police (R2. 158:55, 91).  Julia and the clerk 
then returned to her car to find the robber “fumbling” around inside it (R2. 158:55).  
He was “messing with the lights and the windshield wiper blades and the buttons 
on the dashboard” in an apparent attempt to get the car into reverse (R. 158:55).  
During this time, Julia stood on the passenger side of the car and observed the 
person who robbed her through the windshield (R2. 158:56–58).  She had no trouble 
seeing him because it was dawn, and the Stop ‘n Go was well lit from overhead 
lights outside the store and on the gas pumps (R2. 158:59).  Julia estimated that she 
stood outside her car watching him for two to five minutes (R2. 158:59).  She stated, 
“He was in my car for quite a while” (R2. 158:59). 
 The Stop ‘n Go clerk, Ron Nissen, also observed the robber fumbling about in 
Julia’s car (R2. 158:91–94).  Ron noted that the lighting outside was “pretty good” 
(R2. 158:93).  He observed the robber from the front of the car and then moved 
around to the driver’s side and watched him from three feet away for about a 
minute (R2. 158:57, 92–93).  At one point, they looked at each other through the 
driver’s side window, and Ron said, “I don’t know why you’re doing this, but it’s 
not going to get you anywhere, you’re just going to get caught” (R2. 158:94).  At that 
point, the robber jumped out of the car and ran off (R2. 158:94). 
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 The subsequent police investigation yielded no immediate results (R2. 158:61).  
During the months following the robbery, Julia did not go back to the Stop ‘n Go 
and would not look others in the face for fear that she would see the robber again 
(R2. 158:68).  A few times after the robbery, she thought she saw the man who 
robbed her, but she never reported the sightings to the police because she “wasn’t 
ever 100 percent sure” (R2. 158:68). 
Two Years Later 
 On February 14, 2003, as part of a separate investigation of a different crime, 
police showed Julia a photo lineup containing Miller’s photo (R2. 158:94).  She 
immediately expressed excitement and surprise and identified Miller as the man 
who robbed her (R2. 158:64, 83).  Later, on April 24, 2003, Julia attended a live line-
up at the Salt Lake County Jail (R2. 158:65).  Julia again identified Miller as the man 
who robbed her (R2. 158:66). 
 Ron Nissen also identified Miller in a photo line-up (R2. 158:94–95).  
Miller’s Alibi 
 At trial, Miller testified that in December 2000 he was living and working in 
Louisiana (R2. 158:45–46, 103).  Miller and the State stipulated to the following facts: 
1. That Harry Miller was employed by the Ten M. Corporation on 
[sic] Donaldsonville, Louisiana, from the end of May 2000 until 
February 2002.  Further, that Harry Miller was on medical leave from 
November 25, 2000 until December 13, 2000. 
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2. On November 25, 2000, Harry Miller was admitted into the River 
West Medical Center for a cerebrovascular accident with Boca’s 
aphasia (commonly known as a stroke) and released from the River 
West Medical Center. 
(R2. 40; 158:110). 
 Miller’s stroke caused the entire right side of his body to go “dead” on him 
(R2. 158:105).  He had trouble speaking and had to move in with his sister until he 
recovered (R2. 158:105–06).  Miller claimed that on December 8, 2000, the date of the 
robbery, his speech was still “mumbled,” and he had a nurse who visited him to 
help him learn to speak (R2. 158:108). 
 Miller admitted that he had lived in Salt Lake City from 1989 to 1999 (R2. 
158:103).  He also admitted that his brother, Wilbert, lived in Salt Lake City and that 
he had occasionally lived with his brother (R2. 158:107).  Wilbert was present at 
Miller’s trial but Miller did not call him as a witness (R2. 158:107). 
 In closing argument, the State pointed out that, although Miller was living in 
Louisiana at the time of the robbery, nobody could account for his whereabouts 
between November 28, 2000, and December 13, 2000 (R2. 158:134).  The State 
explained that this time gap allowed Miller time to travel to Salt Lake City to visit 
his brother, commit the robbery, and return to Louisiana (R2. 158:114–15). The State 
also noted that the effects of Miller’s stroke were likely mild as he was released from 
the hospital after only four days (R2. 158:114–15). 
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 The jury convicted Miller (R2. 83).  Miller appealed, and his case was 
remanded to the trial court to supplement the record with evidence relevant to 
Miller’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (R2. 252–54). 
The Rule 23B Hearing 
 On September 26, 2005, the trial court held a rule 23B hearing at which the 
court heard testimony from Miller’s attorneys and scheduled a continuation of the 
hearing to hear testimony from Miller’s niece, Berthella (R2. 610:50; 611:8).  Berthella 
traveled to Utah by bus and appeared at the hearing at which Miller also testified 
(R2. 611). 
 At the September 26th hearing, Miller’s first appellate attorney, Kent Hart, 
testified that after receiving the case from trial counsel and reviewing it, he decided 
to further investigate Miller’s alibi claim (R2. 610:9).  He discovered hospital records 
in the case file that showed that Miller was picked up from the hospital by his niece, 
Berthella Miller, and his employer, Lisa Snyder (R2. 610:10).  Nothing in the records 
indicated that Berthella and Ms. Snyder had any role in caring for Miller other than 
picking him up from the hospital (R2. 610:17).  Mr. Hart located Ms. Snyder’s 
number and called her (R2. 610:19–20).  She gave him a telephone number for 
Berthella Miller (R2. 610:11).  Mr. Hart then called Berthella Miller, who stated that 
she had helped care for Miller after his stroke (R2. 610:11). 
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 Mr. Hart also discovered in the hospital records a treatment plan by a home 
healthcare agency (R2. 610:13).  He did not discover which agency had administered 
the plan or which nurses had cared for Miller (R2. 610:13).  Instead he turned the 
case over to outside counsel (R2. 610:13). 
 After Mr. Hart’s testimony, the State and Miller stipulated to the admission of 
affidavits from Melissa Landry, the records custodian of River West Home 
Healthcare, and Beverly Kolder, a nurse from River West Home Healthcare who 
visited Miller (R2. 610:22–23).  The parties also stipulated to the admission of 
Miller’s medical records from River West Home Healthcare, which were attached to 
Ms. Kolder’s affidavit (R2. 610:23).  Those records established that Ms. Kolder had 
visited Miller on December 7, 2000 at 11:00 a.m. and December 14, 2000 (R2. 610:23; 
Defense Exhibit 3).  The records also established that Miller had missed visits on 
December 4, 2000, December 6, 2000, and December 11, 2000 (R2. 610:24; State’s 
Exhibits 2–3). 
 The State then presented testimony from Miller’s trial counsel, John 
O’Connell, Jr. (R2. 610:27).  Mr. O’Connell stated that Miller had suggested an alibi 
defense, but that he was only able to provide the name of the company he was 
working for and the name and a partial address for his sister, Paula Miller (R2. 
610:28).  Miller did not tell Mr. O’Connell about his niece, Berthella.  In addition, 
Miller could not remember the name of the hospital or the home healthcare agency 
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that treated him, nor could he remember the name of the nurses who cared for him 
(R2. 610:30–31, 36).  Mr. O’Connell testified that Miller’s “memory of this whole time 
was not the best,” and he could not recall Miller naming any other alibi witnesses 
besides Paula (R2. 610:31). 
 Mr. O’Connell mailed a letter to Paula’s partial address (R2. 610:28–29).  Paula 
responded to the letter and was initially very cooperative (R2. 610:29).  She provided 
contact information for Miller’s former employer, tracked down the hospital where 
he was treated, and agreed to testify at trial that she had cared for him during the 
two weeks he recovered from his stroke (R2. 610:30).  With Paula’s help, Mr. 
O’Connell was able to obtain Miller’s hospital records (R2. 610:42).  Mr. O’Connell 
was not able to determine from those records which home health care agency Miller 
had used (R2. 610:36). 
 At some point before the trial, Paula changed her mind (R2. 610:30).  She 
refused to travel to Utah to testify and was “very emphatic about it” (R2. 610:30).  
Mr. O’Connell asked Paula, “Can you tell me of anybody else or anyone who could 
[come out], instead of bringing you out, can you provide me with somebody else 
who could do it?” (R2. 610:30).  Paula replied that she could not (R2. 610:30). 
 Mr. O’Connell decided not to try to force Paula to come out by subpoena 
because he believed that Miller’s “alibi at the time was pretty strong” (R2. 610:44).  
 
 
11
He was also concerned that Paula might become a hostile witness if he forced her to 
travel to Utah for the trial (R2. 610:45). 
 At the continuation of the evidentiary hearing, Miller testified that he told Mr. 
O’Connell about Berthella and the visits from the home healthcare nurse (R2. 611:5–
6).  He admitted, however, that at the time of trial he did not know Berthella’s phone 
number and did not know where Berthella was living (R2. 611:9).  He also did not 
know the nurse’s name or the name of the home health care agency that treated him 
(R2. 611:6–7). 
 Berthella also testified (R2. 611:13).  She asserted that she was living with 
Paula and Miller after Miller’s stroke (R2. 611:13-14).  Berthella admitted, however, 
that she had previously told counsel for the state that at the time Miller had his 
stroke, she was not living with Paula, and that she lived a couple of minutes away 
(R2. 611:23).  Berthella stated, “[a]t that time I had moved out.  And I said I had 
moved out but I were [sic] living with her.”  (R2. 611:23).  When asked again if she 
had previously said that she was not living with Paula when Miller was recovering 
from his stroke, Berthella said, “I think so.  I don’t know.  I been having so many 
questions asked.  But I was living there at the time, then I moved out.”  (R2. 611:23). 
 Berthella testified that she saw Miller every day after work while he was 
recovering from his stroke (R2. 611:15).  But on cross-examination, she admitted that 
she sometimes worked a double shift and that it was possible that while Miller was 
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recovering from his stroke, she might have been at work from four in the morning 
until eleven at night (R2. 611:27).  She admitted therefore that on at least one day she 
might not have seen him because she was at work until late at night (R2. 611:28). 
 Eight months before the hearing, Berthella signed an affidavit in which she 
attested to the date Miller was admitted to the hospital, the date she brought him 
home from the hospital, the time period he lived with Paula, and the date Miller 
returned to work.   She could not, however, remember any of those dates at the 
hearing (R2. 611:15–16, 24–26).  When questioned about her memory lapse at the 
hearing, she replied, “I didn’t remember.  I’m sorry.  I didn’t remember.” (R2. 
611:25). 
 The trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law (R13-26). It 
ruled that John O’Connell was not deficient for failing to locate Miller’s home 
healthcare records or Miller’s niece, Berthella (R24-25).  It determined that Miller 
and his sister had not provided Mr. O’Connell with enough information to locate 
the records or to contact Berthella and had not told him of Berthella’s importance 
(R24-25).  Specifically, it found that neither Miller nor his sister had provided Mr. 
O’Connell with the name of the home healthcare agency that cared for Miller or the 
names of any nurses that visited him (R15).  It also found that the agency and nurses 
were not identified in Miller’s hospital records (R15).  The court further found that 
while Berthella was mentioned briefly in the hospital records, neither Miller nor his 
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sister told Mr. O’Connell of Berthella’s whereabouts or that she had helped care for 
Miller (R19-20). 
 The court ruled that Miller suffered no prejudice from his counsel’s conduct.  
It determined that “in light of the other facts and evidence establishing defendant’s 
guilt, including the credibility of the two eye witnesses who testified at trial, there is 
no reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial” (R25-26).  It noted that 
Miller’s home healthcare records did not establish a complete alibi and that Miller 
“could have traveled by airplane from Louisiana to Utah . . . in time to rob Julia 
Smart . . .” (R17, 24).3   
 The court also found that “[B]ecause of her inconsistent statements and lack of 
memory about crucial information, testimony from Berthella Miller at the 
evidentiary hearing was not credible,” and that “[t]estimony from Berthella Miller 
fails to establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial.”  (R24).       
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 Petitioner failed to meet the requirements of the Postconviction Determination 
of Factual Innocence statute, because his evidence was not newly discovered, his 
counsel was not ineffective, and his evidence failed to prove that he was factually 
innocent.  The burden of proof is upon the petitioner to establish his factual 
                                              
3 The court’s findings, which the State drafted, mistakenly stated that Miller 
could have traveled from Louisiana to Utah in December 2005 rather than December 
2000 (R17). 
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innocence by clear and convincing evidence.  Petitioner’s proffered evidence was 
insufficient to meet that burden.  The district court correctly determined that it was 
not necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing when the evidence petitioner relied on 
in his petition for factual innocence was the same evidence already presented at the 
23B hearing.    
ARGUMENT 
I.       
THE PETITIONER DOES NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE FACTUAL INNOCENCE STATUTE 
 Petitioner claims that his evidence shows that he is factually innocent (pet.’s 
brief at 10).  He also alleges that the law should be read to give every chance to an 
innocent person to be compensated for unjustified imprisonment (pet.’s brief at 17).  
But the first and most important requirement of the factual innocence statute is that 
the person must be able to prove factual innocence - and petitioner has failed to 
meet that requirement.   
A. The Statutory Requirements 
 In 2008 the legislature passed the Postconviction Determination of Factual 
Innocence statute.  Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-401 through 405.  The purpose of the 
statute is to financially compensate one who can prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that he is factually innocent and was wrongly imprisoned.  Id., and see 
addendum H, Exoneration and Assistance Bill: Senate Floor Debate on S.B. 16, 2008 Utah 
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Leg. Gen. Session, Jan. 22, 2008 (statement of Senator Gregory Bell, chief sponsor of 
the bill (0:11 – 15:28).  The statute imposes specific, narrow, requirements that must 
be met in order for a petitioner to be entitled to financial compensation.  A  
petitioner must assert under oath that he is factually innocent.  Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-9-402(2)(a).   In addition, “[t]he burden is upon the petitioner to establish the 
petitioner’s factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.”  Utah Code Ann. 
§78B-9-404(1)(b).  
 A person may petition for a hearing to determine factual innocence only if the 
petition alleges the following information:   
(i)  newly discovered material evidence exists that establishes 
that the petitioner is factually innocent; 
(ii)  the petitioner identifies the specific evidence the petitioner 
claims establishes innocence; 
(iii)  the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence 
that was known; 
(iv)  the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; 
(v)  viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered 
evidence demonstrates that the petitioner is factually 
innocent; and 
(vi)(A) neither the petitioner nor petitioner’s counsel knew of the 
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to 
include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion 
or postconviction motion, and the evidence could not have 
been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner’s counsel 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
      (B) a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing 
to exercise reasonable diligence in uncovering the evidence; 
or 
      (C) the court waives the requirements of Subsection (2)(a)(vi)(A) 
or (2)(a)(vi)(B) in the interest of justice. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(2)(a). 
 Once the petition is filed, the State must answer or otherwise respond.  Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(6)(a).  After the pleadings are closed, “the court shall order a 
hearing if it finds there is a bona fide issue as to whether the petitioner is factually 
innocent of the charges of which the petitioner was convicted.”  Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-9-402(6)(b)(i).4  If there is no bona fide issue as to whether the petitioner is 
factually innocent, a hearing is not required.  Here, the district court determined 
that the petitioner had “not made the required showing for a hearing.”  (R172).   
 In making its determination of factual innocence, the court may consider 
various types of evidence.      
(2) The court may consider: 
  (a) evidence that was suppressed or would be suppressed at a 
criminal trial; and 
  (b) hearsay evidence, and may consider that the evidence is hearsay 
in evaluating its weight and credibility. 
(3)   In making its determination the court shall consider, in addition to 
the evidence presented at the hearing under this part, all the evidence 
presented at the original trial and at any postconviction proceedings in the 
case. 
 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-404(2)&(3). 
                                              
4  “If the parties stipulate that the evidence establishes that the petitioner is 
factually innocent, the court may find the petitioner is factually innocent without 
holding a hearing.”  Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404(6)(b)(ii).     
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 If the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is 
factually innocent, it shall order that the conviction be vacated and expunged.  Utah 
Code Ann. §78B-9-404(4).  After considering all of the evidence, if the court does not 
determine by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is factually innocent 
it shall deny the petition.  Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-404(5). 
B. The petitioner does not meet the statutory requirements to 
establish factual innocence. 
 This case is not about whether petitioner was entitled to a new trial.  This case 
is about whether the petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that he was 
factually innocent.  To be entitled to compensation under the factual innocence 
statute, a petitioner must be able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he 
was wrongly convicted and sent to prison for a crime that he can prove he did not 
commit.  Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402 through 405.  Petitioner does not meet those 
requirements.           
 The petition does not allege newly discovered material evidence.  All of the 
evidence petitioner relies upon was known to petitioner or his counsel at the time of 
trial, and petitioner’s counsel has already been found not to be ineffective.  In 
addition, some of the evidence petitioner relies upon is merely cumulative of 
evidence presented at trial.  Finally, even if petitioner’s evidence were newly 
 
 
18
discovered, when it is viewed with all the other evidence, it does not demonstrate 
that the petitioner is factually innocent.  
1. Petitioner’s evidence is not newly discovered. 
 After the petition was filed, the State filed an answer and a motion to dismiss.  
The State argued that petitioner failed to assert newly discovered material evidence 
in support of his petition, as required under Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-402(2)(a)(1).  
Petitioner’s memorandum in support of his petition refers to the affidavit of Beverly 
Kolder, a registered nurse involved in providing home health care to petitioner in 
Louisiana (R51-52).  It also refers to “additional testimony as to an alibi defense,” 
but it never specifies what that additional testimony is (R50-51).   
 In his opposition to the State’s motion to dismiss, petitioner attempted to 
expand his assertions.  He stated that the new evidence which establishes his 
innocence consists of 1) the affidavit of Beverly Kolder, a registered nurse who 
provided home health care to petitioner in Louisiana on December 7th and 14th, 2000 
(R137-138);  2) the testimony of Berthella Miller5 that she had seen petitioner every 
day during the three weeks he was out of work (R138); and 3) that petitioner was in 
court in Louisiana on December 5, 2000 for fishing without a license (R138).  
                                              
5 Petitioner refers to the testimony of “Defendant’s sister.”  (R138).  However, 
petitioner’s sister did not testify.  It appears that petitioner is actually referring to 
the testimony of his niece, Berthella Miller. 
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 None of this evidence is “new.”  To support his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim in the prior 23B remand, petitioner consistently argued that defense 
counsel knew of the home health visits and of other alibi witnesses, in order to 
argue that counsel should have investigated further and produced the witnesses at 
trial (R83-94).  At the 23B evidentiary hearing, petitioner testified that he told his 
trial attorney about his niece, Berthella, and about the home health care people who 
visited him (R128-129).  In petitioner’s rule 23B motion for remand, he stated that 
“although trial counsel had in his file, and Miller communicated to trial counsel the 
existence of court records showing Miller’s presence in court in Louisiana on 
December 5th, 2000, trial counsel did not attempt to introduce said records at trial.”  
(addendum G, pp. 6-7).  Petitioner’s claim that he has presented newly discovered 
material evidence is contrary to his previous position that this evidence is not new.   
 In addition, petitioner’s evidence fails as a matter of law to meet the statutory 
definition of newly discovered evidence.  As the district court correctly noted in its 
ruling, petitioner’s claims do not meet subsection (vi)(A), requiring newly 
discovered evidence.  Petitioner’s claims do not qualify as newly discovered 
evidence because petitioner was aware of the substance of the evidence at the time 
of trial.  Petitioner knew that he was treated in Louisiana by a home health care 
nurse.  He also knew whether his niece Berthella cared for and/or lived with him 
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following his stroke.  He also knew that he went to court in Louisiana on December 
5, 2000, for the charge of fishing without a license.   
 Because petitioner knew all of this information prior to trial, it is not “newly 
discovered.”  It does not meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-
402(2)(a)(vi)(A), that “neither the petitioner nor petitioner’s counsel knew of the 
evidence at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any 
previously filed post-trial motion or postconviction motion, and the evidence could 
not have been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner’s counsel through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence.”   
2. Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective. 
 Even if evidence does not qualify as newly discovered, it may meet the factual 
innocence statutory requirements if counsel were ineffective for failing to uncover it.  
A person may petition the court for a hearing to establish factual innocence if the 
petition alleges that “a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 
exercise reasonable diligence in uncovering the evidence.”  Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-
402(2)(a)(vi)(B). 
 Petitioner does not meet this requirement, because following the 23B hearing, 
the district court found that trial counsel was not ineffective (R24-26).  Therefore, 
petitioner does not meet the requirement of Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-402(2)(a)(vi)(B), 
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that “a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exercise 
reasonable diligence in uncovering the evidence.”  
3. The evidence presented by petitioner does not prove that he is 
factually innocent.  
 The factual innocence statute provides that a court may waive the 
requirements of subsections (2)(a)(vi)(A) or (B) in the interests of justice.  Utah Code 
Ann. §78B-9-402(2)(a)(vi)(C).  In other words, a court could decide to allow a 
petitioner to proceed in the interests of justice, even if he did not present newly 
discovered evidence, and counsel was not found ineffective.  However, the district 
court specifically decided not to waive these requirements (R172).  The interests of 
justice did not require that these subsections be waived because petitioner also 
could not establish that his evidence was not merely cumulative, or, when viewed 
with all the other evidence, that it demonstrated that he was factually innocent.  §§ 
78B-9-402(2)(a)(ii), (iii) & (v).   
 The district court found that petitioner had not shown that the evidence was 
not merely cumulative of evidence already presented at trial (R172).  Petitioner 
already presented an alibi defense at trial.  As set out in the fact section above, 
petitioner testified at trial that at the time of the crime he was living and working in 
Louisiana (R2.158:45-46, 103).  The parties stipulated that petitioner was employed 
in Louisiana from May 2000 until February 2002, that he had a stroke on November 
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25, 2000, and that he was on medical leave from November 25, 2000 until December 
13, 2000 (R2.40; 158:110).  Petitioner also testified at trial that after his stroke his 
speech was still “mumbled” and that he had a nurse who visited him to help him 
learn to speak (R2. 158:108).  The district court found that petitioner had not shown 
that the evidence presented in support of his factual innocence petition was not 
merely cumulative of evidence already presented at trial (R172).  Therefore, 
petitioner failed to meet section 78B-9-402(2)(a)(iii). 
 More importantly, petitioner failed to identify specific evidence that 
established his innocence, and when viewed with all the other evidence, the 
evidence he presented does not demonstrate that he is factually innocent.  The 
district court stated that it had “reviewed this evidence as part of a remand from the 
court of appeals and determined that there was ‘no reasonable probability of a 
different outcome at trial even if [the new witnesses] had testified.’” (R172).   
 In his brief, petitioner acknowledges that “[i]t still may be true that Defendant 
could conceivably have gotten on an airplane, come out to Utah, and robbed a 
stranger for a few dollars, nowhere near enough to pay for the airplane ticket; but at 
this point, everyone must concede that this does not make sense.”  (pet.’s brief at 
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24).6  Petitioner himself acknowledges that he could have committed this crime.  
Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proof to establish by “clear and 
convincing evidence” that he is factually innocent.  He is therefore not entitled to 
relief under the factual innocence statute.  
C.  The petitioner bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence that he is factually innocent.   
 Petitioner claims that “the State must bear some burden to overcome the 
presumption of innocence.”  (pet.’s brief at 25).  However, petitioner is not entitled 
to a presumption of innocence.  The presumption of innocence only applies in a 
criminal action.  “A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent 
until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (West 2008); see also Coffin v. United States, 156 
U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394 (1895).  A petition for post-conviction determination of 
factual innocence is not a criminal proceeding.  It is a civil action.  The rules of civil 
procedure apply.  Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(4).  Therefore, the presumption of 
                                              
6 The State does not concede that petitioner committing this crime does not 
make sense.  Petitioner apparently believes that the crime would make sense only if 
there had been several hundred dollars in the victim’s purse.  But how much money 
a robber steals does not establish whether the crime made sense or not.  A robber 
seldom knows beforehand how much money he is going to get when he steals a 
woman’s purse.  Petitioner also ignores the fact that, in addition to stealing the 
victim’s purse, he also tried to steal her car - perhaps in order to drive back to 
Louisiana. 
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innocence does not apply to a petitioner who has filed a petition for the 
determination of factual innocence.    
 The factual innocence statute provides that “[t]he burden is upon the 
petitioner to establish the petitioner’s factual innocence by clear and convincing 
evidence.”  Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404(1)(b). 
 The petitioner brings this civil action by filing a petition for the determination 
of factual innocence.  It is entirely his burden to establish his factual innocence by 
clear and convincing evidence.  Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404(1)(b).   
II. 
THE FACT THAT THE CONVICTION WAS REVERSED ON 
APPEAL AND THE CASE DISMISSED DOES NOT ESTABLISH 
PETITIONER’S INNOCENCE AND DOES NOT EXCUSE HIM 
FROM ANY OF THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS 
A. The fact that the conviction was reversed on appeal and the case 
has been dismissed is not sufficient to meet the requirements of 
the factual innocence statute. 
 Petitioner asserts that it “approaches the absurd to read this statute not to 
favor compensation where the conviction has been reversed on appeal, and the case 
has been dismissed.”  (pet.’s brief at 19-20).  The statute must be read according to 
its terms.  Nothing in the language of the statute establishes that a person is entitled 
to compensation merely because a conviction has been reversed on appeal or 
because a case has been dismissed.   
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 The statute is clearly not meant to require the State to pay money to every 
petitioner whose conviction has been overturned.  As the sponsor of the legislation, 
Senator Bell, stated in his summation when presenting the bill:  “The mere fact that 
the prisoner has been released from jail does not establish the right to have a claim 
under this fund.”  (addendum H, Exoneration and Assistance Bill: Senate Floor Debate 
on S.B. 16, 2008 Utah Leg. Gen. Session, Jan. 22, 2008 (statement of Senator Gregory 
Bell, chief sponsor of the bill) (15:28)).     
 Cases are frequently reversed or dismissed for reasons that have nothing to 
do with whether the defendant is factually innocent.  For example, cases may be 
reversed because of erroneous jury selection or instruction, prosecutorial 
misconduct, discovery violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, or errors in the 
admission or exclusion of evidence or testimony.  Similarly, a case may be dismissed 
rather than being retried for numerous reasons that have nothing to do with 
whether the defendant is factually innocent.  For example, a case may not be retried 
because of witness unavailability, because the victim does not want to go through 
another trial, or because the defendant has already served most of the originally 
imposed sentence.  The fact that a case is reversed or dismissed does not establish 
that the defendant is innocent.  Recognizing this fact, the legislature placed a high 
burden of proof – clear and convincing evidence – on those seeking compensation 
under the factual innocence statute.     
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 When the State chose not to retry the case, it filed a motion to dismiss.  The 
motion to dismiss stated that the District Attorney moved to dismiss “in the 
interests of justice.”  (addendum F).  Petitioner asserts that “the State refused to take 
this case to retrial, based on newly discovered weaknesses in the evidence.”  (pet.’s 
brief at 22-23).  The statute sets out what is required to prove factual innocence and 
entitle a petitioner to compensation.  Weakness in the evidence is not sufficient to 
meet the statutory requirements.  Weakness in the evidence does not prove factual 
innocence and does not entitle a petitioner to financial compensation.     
 Petitioner also contends that the credibility of the two eyewitnesses who 
testified at trial was “seriously questioned by both sides.”  (pet.’s brief at 23).  This 
statement is not accurate.  Nevertheless, even if true, the fact that eyewitness 
testimony is questioned does not establish factual innocence.  Again, the statute sets 
out the necessary prerequisites for establishing factual innocence in order to be 
entitled to compensation.  Questioning the credibility of witnesses is not one of 
them.   
 In addition, the credibility of the victim’s eyewitness testimony has never 
been questioned by the State.  In support of his position that the credibility of the 
other eye witness was questioned, petitioner refers to an e-mail from the deputy 
district attorney which stated: “I have some concern that a third person identified 
your client as a former customer.”  (R156).  All this establishes is that the deputy 
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district attorney had a question about the testimony.  It does not establish that the 
identification of petitioner as the robber was incorrect.  
  The eyewitness picked petitioner from a photo line-up.  He also stated that he 
recognized petitioner as a “customer who came into the store once in a while.” 
(R154).  Petitioner apparently believes that the eyewitness must be mistaken,  
because at the time of the crime, petitioner was living in Louisiana.  However, 
petitioner admitted at trial that he previously lived in Salt Lake (R2. 158:103).  
Petitioner may have been a customer in the store when he lived in Salt Lake, or 
while he was in Salt Lake visiting his brother.  In the alternative, the eyewitness may 
have correctly identified petitioner as the robber, even if he was mistaken about 
petitioner being a customer who came into the store.  The fact that the deputy 
district attorney had some questions about this witnesses identification of petitioner 
as a customer does not establish that petitioner is innocent.   
 The fact that the case was reversed on appeal does not establish that the 
petitioner is innocent.  The fact that the State stipulated that there was an error in 
the trial proceedings, which justified a remand for a new trial, does not establish 
that the petitioner is innocent.  The fact that the State chose not to proceed with the 
re-trial also does not establish that the petitioner is innocent.  None of these facts 
meets the requirements of the factual innocence statute.  
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B. The fact that a conviction was reversed on appeal and the case has 
been dismissed does not excuse petitioner from any of the 
statutory requirements. 
 Petitioner argues that “he is not specifically restrained by the language of 
§78B-9-402((2)(a).” [sic]  (pet.’s brief at 21).  Petitioner reasons that he should not be 
required to “show that the information regarding innocence was unknown to him or 
to his counsel at the time of the original trial [because] the results of that trial did not 
stand[].” (pet.’s brief at 21).   
 The factual innocence statute states that it applies to “[a] person who has been 
convicted of a felony offense.”  Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(2)(a).  Petitioner was 
convicted of a felony offense.  The statute does not include any exceptions or special 
rules for petitioners whose convictions were reversed on appeal or whose cases 
were dismissed rather than being retried. 
 The plain language of the statute establishes that the statute applies to 
everyone who files a petition for determination of factual innocence, regardless of 
the current status of their conviction.  Under the plain language of the statute, there 
is no reason why petitioner would or should be excused from meeting any of the 
statutory requirements.   
 Petitioner has stated no authority for his claim that parts of the statute do not 
apply to him, merely because his case was remanded for a new trial, and then no 
new trial was held.  As stated above, there are numerous reasons why a conviction 
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might be reversed that have nothing to do with factual innocence.  The fact that a 
conviction was reversed does not establish that parts of the factual innocence statute 
no longer apply.   
 To the contrary, the factual innocence statute applies to any “person who has 
been convicted of a felony offense.”  Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-402(2)(a).  Therefore 
any person who was ever convicted of a felony offense in the State of Utah, and who 
can meet the requirements of the statute, may file a petition for determination of 
factual innocence at any time.  Defendants still in custody may file a petition, 
whether or not their convictions were affirmed on appeal.  Persons who have 
completed their sentence and been released from prison may file a petition.  Persons 
whose convictions were reversed or remanded on appeal may file a petition.  Even 
persons who have already obtained postconviction relief that vacated or reversed 
their conviction may filed a petition.  Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-402(2)(b).   
 When engaging in statutory construction, “[w]e look first to the plain 
language of the statute to discern the legislative intent."  City of Salt Lake v. Salt Lake 
County, 925 P.2d 954, 957 (Utah 1996)(citations omitted).  “Where statutory language 
is plain and unambiguous, appellate courts cannot look beyond the language to 
divine legislative intent, but must construe the statute according to its plain 
language.”  State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993)(citing Brinkerhoff v. 
Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989)); see also Norman J. Singer, Sutherland 
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Statutory Construction § 46.01 (5th ed. 1992)(if statutory meaning is clear, court’s 
sole function is to enforce statute according to its terms). 
 Applying the fundamental rules of statutory interpretation, petitioner cannot 
establish that any of the statutory requirements do not apply to him, merely because 
his conviction was reversed and his case dismissed.  The statutory reading 
petitioner urges upon this Court is contrary to the statute’s plain and unambiguous 
language.  Therefore, petitioner’s claim that he should not be required to show that 
the information regarding innocence was unknown to him or to his counsel at the 
time of the original trial because the results of that trial did not stand, should be 
rejected.   
C. The fact that petitioner’s evidence could have been presented at a 
retrial does not establish that he does not have to meet the 
requirements of the factual innocence statute. 
 In support of his position that he should not be required to show that the 
information regarding innocence was unknown to him or his counsel at the time of 
trial, petitioner argues that if he had gone to retrial, he could have introduced all 
available evidence of his innocence, regardless of when and how it was discovered 
(pet.’s brief at 21).  In other words, at a retrial, petitioner could have introduced 
evidence that does not qualify as newly discovered under the factual innocence 
statute.  The State agrees (so long as the evidence met admissibility requirements).  
If a retrial had been held, petitioner may have been convicted again.  On the other 
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hand, if a retrial had been held and petitioner had been acquitted, he would be in 
the same position he is in right now.  An acquittal upon retrial would not 
necessarily establish that the petitioner was innocent.     
 When a jury does not convict, they find the defendant “not guilty,” they do 
not make a finding of “innocent.”  Just as innocent people might be convicted, guilty 
people might be acquitted.  A person may be acquitted not because they were 
innocent, but because there was reasonable doubt or insufficient evidence.  See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-403(2) (“There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a 
finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was 
insufficient evidence to warrant conviction.”).   
“In ordinary law usage, the term not guilty is often considered to be 
synonymous with innocent.  In American criminal jurisprudence, 
however, they are not totally synonymous.  ‘Not Guilty’ is a legal 
finding by the jury that the prosecution has not met its burden of proof.  
A ‘Not Guilty’ verdict can result from either of two states of mind on 
the part of the jury: that they believe the defendant is factually innocent 
and did not commit the crime; or, although they do not necessarily 
believe he is innocent, and even ‘tend’ to believe he did commit the 
crime, the prosecution’s case was not sufficiently strong to convince 
them of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”   
 
State v. Keeler, 238 Kan. 356, 362, 710 P.2d 1279, 1285 (1985) (quoting Bugliosi, Not 
Guilty and Innocent: The Problem Children of Reasonable Doubt, Vol. 20, No. 2, Court 
Review 16 (1983)).    
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 If petitioner had gone through a retrial and had been acquitted, he could have 
filed a petition for determination of factual innocence.  However, he still would have 
had to meet the statutory requirements in order to be entitled to financial 
compensation under the factual innocence statute.  Therefore, the fact that the case 
was dismissed, rather than going to retrial, does not excuse petitioner from having 
to meet all of the requirements of the factual innocence statute.   
III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
ANOTHER EVIDENTIARY HEARING DUPLICATING THE 23B 
HEARING WAS NOT NECESSARY  
 In granting the State’s motion to dismiss the factual innocence petition, the 
district court noted that it had already reviewed the evidence in the 23B remand and 
had “determined that there was ‘no reasonable probability of a different outcome at 
trial even if [the new witnesses] had testified.’” (R172, quoting R25-26).     
 The petitioner claims that the district court should have held an evidentiary 
hearing in his factual innocence case, and that the court erred by relying on its 
previous findings following the 23B hearing (pet.’s brief at 9-10, 16-17).  However, in 
support of his factual innocence petition, the petitioner relied on the evidence 
already presented during the 23B hearing.  In the memorandum in support of his 
petition for factual innocence, the petitioner referred to the affidavit of Beverly 
Kolder, filed in support of his 23B motion (R51-52).  Petitioner also attached to his 
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petition a copy of the court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law following the 
23B evidentiary hearing (R13-26).  In his opposition to the State’s motion to dismiss, 
petitioner referred to additional evidence presented in the 23B action (R138, 143-
146).   
 Petitioner has failed to establish or even assert that he has any additional 
facts, testimony or evidence to present that was not already presented at the 23B 
hearing.  Therefore, it was entirely appropriate for the district court to consider the 
evidence and findings from the 23B hearing.  And there was no reason to hold a 
duplicate hearing.  Petitioner has no right to relitigate factual determinations 
already made.  Cf.  Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 443 (Utah 1996) (“‘The minimum 
reach of issue preclusion beyond precise repetition of the first action is to prevent 
relitigation by mere introduction of cumulative evidence bearing on a simple 
historical fact that has once been decided.’”) (citation omitted); Oman v. Davis School 
Dist., 2008 UT 70, ¶ 31, 194 P.3d 956 (citing Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 
P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983) (“[I]ssue preclusion ‘prevents the relitigation of issues that 
have been once litigated and determined in another action even though the claims for 
relief in the two actions may be different.”)  
 The facts upon which petitioner bases his factual innocence petition were 
already fully litigated in the 23B evidentiary hearing.  Petitioner had his day in court 
in the 23B hearing, where he was given all of the process to which he was due, and 
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the factual issues were completely, fully, and fairly litigated.  Cf. 3D Constr. and 
Development, L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 307, ¶ 20, 117 P.3d 1082 
(citing Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 391 (Utah App 1987). 
 Petitioner alleges that he was entitled to de novo review, and not “improper 
deference to a previously discredited ruling.”  (pet.’s brief at 22).  However, it was 
not improper for the court to look to its previous 23B ruling, and the court’s 23B 
ruling has not been discredited.   
 Petitioner claims that the “parties have stipulated” that the court’s previous 
ruling following the 23B hearing “stopped short of doing justice.”  (pet.’s brief at 22).  
That is incorrect.  The parties made no such stipulation.  The language in the 
stipulation submitted on appeal simply states that “in the interests of justice, and to 
expedite the disposition of this case, the parties file this Stipulated Motion for 
Summary Reversal.”  (addendum E, R27).  It further states that “[w]hile preparing 
for oral argument, the parties came to an agreement about the disposition of the 
appeal.  Specifically, they agreed that there was an error in the trial proceedings and 
that the interests of justice dictate that the defendant receive a new trial.”  
(addendum E, R28).  Petitioner already received all of the benefit he was entitled to 
from that agreement and stipulation.  Petitioner’s case was remanded for a new 
trial, and the district attorney chose not to proceed to trial.  Petitioner was therefore 
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released from custody.  As argued above, those facts do not establish that petitioner 
is innocent.     
 Petitioner argues that the 23B ruling was “harsh and illogical.”  (pet.’s brief at 
24).  He also argues that the district court erred when it determined that there was 
“no reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial if [the new witnesses] had 
testified.”  (pet.’s brief at 27, quoting (R172)).  Petitioner attacks the 23B court’s 
findings and argues that the evidence presented at the 23B hearing “clearly did 
justify a reversal.”  (pet.’s brief at 24-25).  The State disagrees.  A lower court’s 
findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ¶ 19, 100 P.3d 1177.  Petitioner did not establish on appeal, and 
has not established in this proceeding, that the 23B findings were clearly erroneous. 
 The district court heard all of the evidence and made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law following the 23B hearing.  The district court found that 
“[e]vidence from the home health care nurse concerning the dates of her visits to 
defendant would have narrowed the window of time that defendant could have 
been gone from Louisiana, but would not have provided an alibi for the date of the 
crime on December 8, 2000.”  (R24).  The district court also made findings about the 
credibility of Berthella Miller.  It found that “[b]ecause of her inconsistent 
statements and lack of memory about crucial information, testimony from Berthella 
Miller at the evidentiary hearing was not credible.”  (R24).   
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 The district court concluded that, “in light of the other facts and evidence 
establishing defendant’s guilt, including the credibility of the two eye witnesses 
who testified at trial, there is no reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial 
even if Beverly Kolder and/or a representative of River West Home Health Care 
and Berthella Miller had testified.”  (R25-26). 
 Petitioner has not presented any legally appropriate basis for holding a 
second hearing to present exactly the same evidence.  “[O]nce a party has had his or 
her day in court and lost, he or she does not get a second chance to prevail on the 
same issues.”  State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 8 at ¶ 2.   
 The district court correctly determined that another evidentiary hearing was 
not necessary, and petitioner has failed to establish that the court’s decision was 
incorrect.     
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
 Respectfully submitted May 7, 2009. 
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Utah Attorney General 
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